Volume 8, Number 1, Spring 2005

CONTENTS
REGULAR ARTICLES
Simulating the Role of Institutions on the Use of Common
Pool Resources ................................................................................ 1
T. R. Huerta
SYMPOSIUM
Symposium on the Enlargement of the European Union:
Part II ..................................................................................... 39
J.-E. Lane
Ready for European Economic and Monetary Union? Party Composition of Government, Budgeting Institutions and Fiscal Deficit in Central and Eastern Europe ......................................... 40
V. Dimitrov
Facing the Challenges of EU Accession: Development of Coordination Structures in Estonia .............................................. 67
K. Viks and T. Randma-Liiv
Enlargement and Normative Reform in the European Union:
The Example of Flexibility ............................................................. 103
A. Warleigh

ABSTRACT. Flexibility (enhanced cooperation) has arisen in the European Union (EU) agenda as a function of recent enlargement rounds and is now one of the key issues in the construction of the EU polity with respect to diversity management. Whether enlargement has provoked normative reform in the EU, taking flexibility as an example is the focus of this article. The author argues that the flexibility case indicates that pressures of enlargement have not produced radical normative change in the EU. Tracing the evolution of enhanced cooperation from the 2000 Treaty of Nice onwards, the evidence points towards the continued existence of the traditional 'frame' of the integration process rather than its rejection in favour of more radical and innovative solutions to the EU's governance problems.

ABSTRACT. This article examines the effect of party composition of government on the centralization of budgeting institutions in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 1989-1999, and assesses the impact of the centralization of budgeting institutions on the capacity of these countries to meet the fiscal deficit requirement for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership. The article finds that centralization of budgeting institutions through delegation to a strong finance minister and/or prime minister is likely to occur in one-party governments or coalition governments composed of parties which expect to fight repeated elections together, with effective punishment mechanisms. The article finds that countries with centralized budgeting institutions are likely to be more capable of meeting the EMU deficit requirement than countries with decentralized institutions.

ABSTRACT. The article analyzes the 'Europeanization' of public administration in Estonia with a specific focus on the development of coordination structures. The decentralized approach to European Union-related matters increases the need for well-functioning coordination practices. The authors conclude that the coordination mechanism established for the accession as well as its impact on the broader coordination culture have been successful and can serve as the role model for the rest of public administration. The broader administrative problems yet to be solved include democratic deficit, insufficient engagement of civil society organizations, potential implementation gap between formal regulations and their practice, as well as poor policy analysis which may become particularly problematic after joining the EU.

ABSTRACT. In 1968, Garrett Hardin identified a class of common goods that suffer under traditional market mechanisms. As a result, institutions become pivotal in defining acceptable consumption behavior. This paper describes the results of an agent-based computer simulation used to study how institutional forces shape consumption patterns. The results suggest common-interested behaviors support a greater population at a higher quality of living; however, exclusively common-interested behaviors result in underutilized commons, and the whole is generally less well off. Overall, when populations generally act in the common-interest, the commons, the population and individuals all experience higher quality outcomes than when they act in generally or exclusively self-interested ways. The paper frames further applications in terms of managing growth for long-term sustainability.

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