Volume 10, Number 4, Winter 2007

CONTENTS
REGULAR ARTICLES
Effect of Privatization on Firm Competitiveness: A Game
Theory Model with Application in the Automotive Industry ......... 431
M. S. Chalhoub
SYMPOSIUM
Institutional Analysis for Environmental Decision-Making: A Symposium ....................................................................................... 469
B. L. Lamb
Symposium Introduction ................................................................. 470
B. L. Lamb
Institutional Analysis in the Evaluation of the Northwest
Economic Adjustment Initiative ...................................................... 476
J. Kusel, H. J. Cortner, and P. Lavigne
Collaborative Watershed Governance in Lake Tahoe: An
Institutional Analysis ........................................................................ 503
D. Kauneckis and M. T. Imperial
Assessing New Governance Strategies for Watershed Planning 547
C. M. Ryan and R. D. Bidwell

BACKGROUND Institutional analysis is "the process of analyzing the design and performance of an institutional arrangement" (Imperial, 1999, p.449). An institutional arrangement is the collection of laws, regulations, policies, and organizations that pertain to a particular policy question. Institutional analysis is unique because it proposes an “explanatory theory" to predict behavior (Ostrom, 1986). As applied to environmental policy, environmental conflict resolution, and environmental management, institutional analysis has emerged as a field that holds great promise but remains underdeveloped. As a contribution to theory, institutional analysis could provide a means to better understand how policy is implemented. As a contribution to the practice of Public Administration, institutional analysis could provide managers with a clearer picture of the context in which they must operate. Ingram and her colleagues (Ingram, Mann, Weatherford & Cortner, 1984) and Ostrom (1986) proposed guidelines for improving institutional analysis. Imperial (1999) and others have argued that the shift toward ecosystem management has led to more comprehensive management processes and increased public involvement. Achieving the hoped-for results of ecosystem management--including the better use of science in decision-making--requires explicit attention to "institutional design and performance" (Imperial, 1999, p. 449). The main concern is how organizations interact. Lamb (1980) and Ostrom (1986) argued that in many fields of policy, organizations consistently play roles as actors in "action arenas." Consequently, the focus of institutional analysis should be on variables such as participants, positions, outcomes, action-outcome linkages, control exercised by the participants, and (perceived) costs and benefits to the actors (after Ostrom [1986]). Ingram et al. (1984) identified 4 tasks of institutional analysis: identifying actors and their stakes, identifying resources actors can use to advance their interests, identifying the orientations of different decision arenas (i.e., how different arenas may be predisposed toward outcomes), and analysis of the means to overcome institutional impediments.

ABSTRACT. An important part of the Northwest Forest Plan was 1.2 billion

dollars of community development assistance made available to northern

California, Oregon, and Washington through the Northwest Economic

Adjustment Initiative (NEAI). The NEAI developed a complex institutional

structure to eliminate regional administrative gridlock and enable workers

and families, businesses, communities, and tribes that depended on forest

product-based economies to regain or improve their economic and social

well-being. As part of an evaluation of NEAI that included 31 community case

studies, institutional analysis gauged how the initiative's institutional and

organizational structure affected program implementation. This paper

examines how the institutional analysis complemented the community case

studies, the use of Schneider and Ingram's policy design framework as a tool

for describing and assessing the initiative's institutional design, and the

lessons learned from the overall evaluation.

ABSTRACT. Over the last decade, new governance-style, collaborative

approaches to environmental management have increased exponentially.

What is not well known is how the structure of these partnerships,

particularly the policies that foster their development, may contribute to the'

ability to achieve either procedural or substantive policy goals. Our study

investigated efforts in the States of Washington and Oregon to encourage

the development of collaborative watershed management institutions. Thirtyfive

watershed partnerships were examined to understand how the planning

groups implement policy objectives and how partnerships are creating or

modifying institutions for planning and implementation. Our findings suggest

that both States face similar challenges in important respects. Challenges

include obtaining adequate participation, developing and sustaining

organizational capacity, and planning implementation. Together, these

findings demonstrate that new governance strategies are not a panacea for

water management.

ABSTRACT. This paper develops and proposes a game theory model

that illustrates the effect of privatization on firm competitiveness using

cases from the automotive industry. We first provide the mathematical

derivation of the model for a competitive industry then address the special

case of a duopoly. We chose the automotive industry as it is a relevant

illustration of global competitive pressures pushing firms to develop strategic

alliances or consolidate. The model shows that privatization has (1) a

positive effect on firm performance given that managerial incentives are well

defined, and (2) facilitates the firm's entry into strategic alliances. We then

turn to discuss Renault's empirically observed success factors in the

European - and gradually global - markets over the last three decades

despite the economic cycles.

ABSTRACT. This paper examines the emergence of collaborative watershed

management in Lake Tahoe by focusing on how institutions managing

coordination and conflict have changed over time. It begins by describing

the evolution of watershed governance and examines the extent to which the

institutional arrangement demonstrates the eight design principles proposed

by Elinor Ostrom for successful common pool resource (CPR) management.

The paper then develops the concept of a complex environmental commons

(CEC) to differentiate the situation of Lake Tahoe from the simpler CPR

dilemmas frequently discussed in the CPR literature. We then propose five

additional principles that contribute to collaborative management of a CEC.

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