“Best Value for Money” in Procurement .................................................................................. 149
Unwritten Ground Rules (UGRS) in Public Procurement in Developing Countries ................. 176
A Model to Measure E-Procurement Impacts on Organizational Performance ....................... 215
An Empirical Analysis of Coercive Means of Enforcing Compliance ....................................... 243
F. A. Mwakibinga and A. Buvik
ABSTRACT. Compliance enforcement is central in issues involving cooperation and delegation of authority. In fact, many proposed mechanisms seek to enhance adherence to the contracted agreements. Generally, monitoring and sanction arrangements constitute one of the widely applied tools to ensure compliance. Notwithstanding the prevailing mixed opinions on the usefulness of such coercive measures, in public procurement, such seemingly drastic measures are also commonly applied to enhance the purchasers’ adherence to the established procurement frameworks. This study investigated the effectiveness of the monitoring and sanction arrangements in enhancing procurement rule compliance in the Tanzania context. Using data generated from a cross-sectional survey conducted between December 2006 and May 2007, this study established that the effectiveness of such enforcement means in the public sector is situational contingent and has to take into account other context-specific factors, which tend to influence the outcome.
ABSTRACT. This paper presents the outcome of research related to application of formal rules and standard procedures in EAs’ procurement of goods and services for foreign aid-funded projects. Executing agencies are entrusted to implement foreign aid-funded projects on behalf of respective governments and they are required to satisfy a combination of rules of their multiple principals, mainly donor organizations and respective government ministries. The theoretical framework of this study is guided by agency theory. The findings indicate that the processing of procurement related information and awarding contracts by the executing agencies in the context of Bangladesh is heavily dependent on the informal working systems or “unwritten ground rules”. These are driven by downward hierarchical verbal and non-verbal instructions. The study has adopted a qualitative method
ollowing a grounded theory approach.
ABSTRACT. This paper presents a model for Public Contracting Authorities to quantify procurement performance benefits that can be achieved by adopting e-procurement. It has been found that e-procurement could generate positive impacts, especially on the efficiency, effectiveness, dematerialization, competitiveness and transparency impact dimensions. Adopting e-procurement in the public sector is far more than just a technological challenge; it embodies a large scale change management effort to create a more efficient procurement culture. Using the performance measurement approach herewith presented helps to tackle this challenge, stimulating the effective use of e-procurement solutions. Measuring how eprocurement is contributing to optimize public expenditure by increasing organizational performances; can help to overcome the resistance to change. Plus, this model can be used to strengthen stakeholder accountability of both Contracting Authorities and public e-procurement service providers. The model has been consistently tested over the last four years with satisfactory results confirming the hypothesis; the case study is herewith exposed. The model can be applied in different context, therefore method and practical recommendations are also provided.
ABSTRACT. A gradual change on how to evaluate successful procurement, in both the private and the public sector has occurred in recent years. Indeed, in so far as economic efficiency is concerned from a price-only criterion for measuring success, decisions have shifted to a multi-criteria approach where various dimensions of quality, as well as price, are considered. The most common way to express such a shift is to say that procurement should deliver “best value for money” (BVM). That is, to award the contract, both monetary and non-monetary components of an offer are to be considered. Whether in competitive bidding or negotiations, BVM is typically formalized by a scoring formula, namely a rule for assigning dimensionless numbers to different elements of an offer, often expressed in different units of measurement. The contract would then be awarded according to the total score obtained by a bid. The main goal of this paper is to present a critical overview of some main themes related to the notion of BVM, discussing few typical forms of scoring rules as a way to formalize the procurer’s preferences.