Volume 14, Number 1, Spring 2014

                               Contents

An Exploration of Knowledge-Based Factors Affecting Procurement Compliance ................... 1
T. G. Hawkins and W. A. Muir

The Politics of Bounded Procurement: Purists, Brokers and the Politics: 

Procurement Dichotomy .......................................................................................................... 33
A. V. Roman

The 2010 "Agreement on Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions" and Its Impact

for the Fight against Fraud and Corruption in Public Procurement .......................................... 62
L. Nesti

Political Connections of the Boards of Directors and Department of Defense Contractors'

Excessive Profits ...................................................................................................................... 96
C. Wang

                                          BOOK REVIEW
Public Procurement, Innovation and Policy: International Perspectives ................................ 123
D. Verbeeten

ABSTRACT. Public procurement officials are bound by extensive policies, procedures, and laws.  However, procurement professionals perpetually struggle to comply with these vast requirements – particularly in the acquisition of services.  The purpose of this research is to explore knowledge-based factors affecting compliance of service contracts.  A regression model using data acquired via survey from 219 U.S. Government procurement professionals reveals that the extent of compliance is affected by buyer experience, personnel turnover, the sufficiency with which service requirements are defined, post-award buyer-supplier communication, and the sufficiency of procurement lead time.  From these results, implications for practice and theory are drawn.  The study concludes with a discussion of limitations and directions for future research.

ABSTRACT. A remarkable example of coordination between IGOs to deal with corruption and fraud in public procurement is the “Agreement for the Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions” signed by the World Bank and the main regional Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in 2010. This article will try to examine the characteristics of the MDBs’ cross debarment agreement and its significance for the MDBs that adhered to it in terms of the process of harmonization that resulted from it. Secondly, the article discusses the potential benefits and challenges connected to the extension of this agreement to other MDBs or to other initiatives that have been initiated in parallel to, or in imitation of, the MDBs’ cross debarment agreement.

ABSTRACT. The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous growth in the body of literature addressing the importance and the impact of contracting and public procurement within the context of devolution of government. The austere budgetary and financial outlooks of the future suggest that the significance of the area will only continue to grow. As such, generating explanatory frameworks, within dimensions such as decision-making and accountability in public procurement, becomes crucial.  Drawing from original research this article suggests one possible frame for understanding administrative decision-making in complex environments. Based on semi-structured interviews with public procurement specialists, the study identifies two decision-making patterns– broker and purist. It is asserted that the decision-making dynamics exhibited by administrators are contingent on their perceptions regarding environmental instability, in particular the political volatility surrounding their work.

ABSTRACT. Despite fast-growing interest in research on political connections, most papers on this topic belong to the economics or public administration fields. Few studies, if any, look into the role of firms’ political connections in the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition area. This paper attempts to bridge this gap by investigating the impact of political connections on the excessive profitability of DoD contractors.  We find that, in contrast to what the “corruption hypothesis” predicts, the excessive profits are less (more) pronounced for those contractors with politically connected (non-connected) boards. Our findings suggest that those politically connected board directors may use their experience to serve a benevolent role to the public in keeping DoD contractors from opportunistic profit-seeking behaviors that could reach or even cross the federal government’s regulatory redline.

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